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I. INTRODUCTION
Proposals to "de-link" the price of new drugs from the profits of
innovators offer a new and important way of thinking about how to
support innovation in pharmaceuticals. Currently, the revenue of
pharmaceutical firms is a product of price and the volume of product
shipped. In an effort to maximize profits, pharmaceutical companies
routinely set high prices that result in greater revenue, even if it means
decreasing the sales volume to some extent.
There are many undesirable effects of the current incentives
model. First, it is almost always profitable to raise prices such that
some patients lack effective access to the drugs. For many drugs, prices
are raised so high as to exclude a large fraction of the total potential
patients in the world. Notably, not even systems of universal insurance
can solve this problem: firms will increase prices until some, not too
many, insurers drop coverage of the drug. In principle, price
discrimination, sometimes called "tiered pricing," can help to solve this
problem, although in practice income-based pricing strategies are an
incomplete solution to problems of international drug pricing.I
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Secondly, the current incentives model makes it more profitable to
invest in drugs that treat diseases that impact the rich, even if there are
already many available treatments and the incremental health gains are
small.
The disconnect between high price and therapeutic value leads to
weakened incentives for the development of drugs that might have the
most health benefit. Lastly, once a drug is on the market, firms are
given incentives to maximize sales, regardless of the potential benefits
to patients. This has led to enormous investments in detailing and drug
promotion2 as well as many scandals associated with misuse of new
drugs.
Enormous benefits could be achieved from creating a
supplementary or alternative system to better align social goals of
improved health with incentives for firms to invest in new drugs. If
firms were rewarded based on the extent that new drugs improve the
health of patients, instead of the ability and/or willingness of patients to
pay, investment in research and development would be better directed.
At the same time, it is of critical global importance that pricing of new
drugs should facilitate access to those drugs. Several proposals have
been made to change the current incentive structure for pharmaceutical
innovation, including, for example, the Sanders Bills, the Health
Impact Fund, and the Bangladesh/Bolivia proposal. All of these
proposals require that the rewards to drug developers be based on
something other than willingness to pay. The obvious basis is, of
course, the benefit to human health. Indeed, it is clear that rewards
should incentivize innovation that generates the largest possible gains.
This is exactly what these proposals recommend.
In 2011, United States Senator Bernie Sanders introduced two
new bills that aimed to delink the cost of research and development
from the cost of the products. 3 The Medical Innovation Prize Fund Act
and the Prize Fund for HIV/AIDS Act, collectively referred to as the
Sanders Bills, propose a mechanism to separate the market for
innovation from the price of the drugs.4 The first version of the Sanders
2. Marc-Andr6 Gagnon & Joel Lexchin, The Cost of Pushing Pills: A New
Estimate of Pharmaceutical Promotion Expenditures in the United States, 5 PLOS
MED. 1, 29, 32 (2008).
3. See Medical Innovation Prize Fund Act, S. 1137, 112th Cong. § 2 (2011); Prize
Fund for HIV/AIDS Act, S. 1138, 112th Cong. § 2 (2011).
4. Medical Innovation Prize Fund Act, supra note 3, at 2.
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bill was the Medical Innovation Prize Act.5 Rewards would be based,
inter alia, on the number of patients who benefit and the "incremental
therapeutic benefit" of the new drug or vaccine, relative to the pre-
existing standard of treatment.6 Furthermore, the bills would eliminate
any legal barriers to the production and sale of generic drugs and
vaccines.7 This would further enhance access by facilitating lower
prices. It would also realign incentives for drug developers to focus on
innovative drugs that would have the greatest impact. Contributions to
the fund would be made by both the government and private insurance
companies, amply financed by the substantial savings that would arise
from lower prices. As first proposed in 2005, the evaluation of the
value of the products would be made annually, over a period of ten
years.8
The governments of Bangladesh and Suriname joined Barbados
and Bolivia to propose a Chagas Disease Prize Fund to the World
Health Assembly (WHA). The idea stemmed from earlier proposals
by Barbados and Bolivia to the WHA in 2008 and was used to show
how a prize fund can be used to increase access by focusing on a
currently neglected disease.10 The Chagas Disease Prize Fund would
be used to reward developers of new treatments, vaccines, or diagnostic
devices that improve health outcomes.11 The fund would be endowed
with $250 million from which prizes could be awarded to various
products. 12 New vaccines and medicines could claim final product
prizes, whereas innovative mechanisms for technical challenges would
qualify for the best contributions funding. A portion of the best
contributions funding would be allocated specifically for researchers in
developing countries. All winners of the prize would have to license
their intellectual property to a patent pool, enabling generic production
and sales.
The Health Impact Fund (HIF) is a pay-for-performance proposal
5. Medical Innovation Prize Act, H. R. 417, 109th Cong. (2005).
6. Medical Innovation Prize Fund Act, supra note 3, at 13.
7. Id. at 2; Prize Fund for HIV/AIDS Act, supra note 3, at 4.
8. H. R. 417 109th Cong. § Il(b) (2005).
9. See generally Chagas Disease Prize Fund for the Development of New
Treatments, Diagnostics and Vaccines, Bangl.-Barb.-Bol.-Surin., WHO (proposed
April 15, 2009).
10. Id. at 1.
11. Id. at 2.
12. Id. at 2, 6.
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designed to use health impact assessment to incentivize the
development and delivery of new medicines. 13 Pharmaceutical firms
would have the option to register new medicines with the fund. By
registering, a firm would agree to provide the drug at cost price
globally. In return, the firm would be rewarded based on an assessment
of the actual global health impact of the drug. Because registration with
HIF would be voluntary, the mechanism would act as a supplementary
option to the existing patent system. Firms could choose whether or not
to register a drug with the HIF, based on which option they felt would
be most profitable. In this way, the HIF would use market incentives to
realign the interest of pharmaceutical companies with actual health
impact, thereby facilitating lower prices, improved access to essential
drugs, and increased innovation of drugs for currently neglected
diseases. Once a drug is registered with the HIF, the firm would receive
a share of a fixed fund for ten years, in proportion to the share of the
health impact of the registered drugs. In exchange, the firm would
agree to sell its product worldwide at a low price, roughly equal to the
average cost of manufacture. Following the ten-year reward period, the
firm would be required to offer a royalty-free open license for generic
versions of the product. The HIF would be most attractive for products
that are expected to have a large global health impact but relatively low
profitability under monopoly pricing.
The proposals summarized above all have a reward mechanism
based in whole or in part on incremental therapeutic benefit. If rewards
are to be based on the incremental therapeutic benefit, it is necessary
that there be some way of measuring this benefit and estimating the
difference between it and the pre-existing standard of care. The
questions we address in this brief paper are how accurate such
measurement must be to improve outcomes and what issues could arise
when implementing pay-for-performance mechanisms based on health
benefits for pharmaceuticals.
Our analysis contains two broad components. First, we explore
the question of how precise assessments of health outcomes need to be
in order to limit reward risk. Second, we consider the problem of how
precise measurements need to be to limit moral hazard on the part of
firms that obtain rewards.14 As we will show, neither risk nor moral
13. AIAN HOLLIS & THOMAS POGGE, THE HEALTH IMPACT FuND: MAKING NEW
MEDICINES ACCESSIBLE FOR ALL, 3-4 (Incentives for Global Health 2008).
14. Moral hazard, as we discuss below, is a standard problem in agency, in which
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hazard creates a requirement for extraordinary precision in
measurement. This is an important observation for establishing the
feasibility of the delinkage mechanisms.
As a preliminary, it is useful to describe the system that forms the
basis of a comparison: the price system. In the price system, firms
obtain their reward through the difference between the price and the
cost of producing a dose of the medicine. The price is constrained by
demand, as for other products, but demand is often driven by
government policies concerning insurance. In most developed
countries, state-financed insurance schemes use a cost-effectiveness
analysis to decide how much to pay; and in developing countries,
where insurance tends to be spotty, the set of drugs that is insured often
excludes high-priced branded drugs. Thus, the price system is not a
"free" market in the usual sense and it generally is heavily influenced
already by government policy.
II. UNCERTAINTY
One of the common criticisms of prize systems is that they may
increase risk to the firms that participate, compared to other systems of
rewarding intellectual property.15 One of the concerns is that poor
measurement of health outcomes could result in incorrect reward
amounts.
To frame the issue more precisely, the question is whether a
system in which an administrator assesses the value of a drug based on
observed outcomes and clinical trial results increases risk to the firm,
relative to a system in which insurers assess product quality based on
pre-approval clinical trials and then negotiate price based on the trial
results (i.e., the price system described above). That is, is a system with
rewards more or less risky than a price system without on-going
clinical evidence? Notably, we are not trying to assess risks against
some alternative system in which pricing is not related to the assessed
therapeutic benefit of the product.
an "agent" (in this case the firm being rewarded) has incentives to behave
inappropriately from the perspective of the "principal" (in this case the rewarding
organization), given hidden information about the agent's actions. Bengt Holmstrom,
Moral Hazard and Observability, 10 BELL J. ECoN. 74, 74-75 (1979).
15. Marlynn Wei, Should Prizes Replace Patents? A Critique of the Medical
Innovation Prize Act of 2005, B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 25, 32, 34, 44 (2007); Michael
Abramowicz, Perfecting Patent Prizes, 56 VAND. L. REv. 115, 123 (2003).
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To simplify the problem, it is useful to divide the risks into two
types. The first relates to the overall level of reimbursement per
QALY, or whatever tool is used to measure the therapeutic benefit of
the product.16 We assume here, without intending to limit the
discussion, that the insurer measures health benefits in terms of
QALYs. Generally, it may be difficult to capture all of the relevant
health benefits in terms of QALYs, so we assume that the insurer is
able to make some adjustments for other relevant benefits of the
products. However, in the discussion that follows, we assume that there
is some tool for assessing the value created by new drugs; we will use
QALYs as the shorthand for this tool. The second type of risk relates to
the insurer's accuracy in measuring the number of QALYs (or benefits)
provided by the product.
A. RISK RELA TING TO THE A VERA GE REVENUES PER QALY
One type of risk is that the insurer, for some reason, cuts back on
payments to drug manufacturers, across the board. We know that this
risk exists in price-based markets. For example, in recent years, both
Germany and Greece have required across-the-board price cuts for
pharmaceuticals supplied to the public system. Generally, in any
16. A QALY, or Quality-Adjusted Life-Year, is a measure used by insurers and
health economists to measure health outcomes in a way that allows comparison across
individuals and conditions. See HOLLIS & POGGE, supra note 13, at 9. An extra year in
full health is 1 QALY; an extra year in imperfect health is worth less than 1 QALY.
Using various techniques, health economists have developed estimates the weights that
are appropriate for different health states. QALYs create a common currency for
evaluating health interventions, since one can directly compare different outcomes: for
example, one might compare an intervention that saved 3 people from death, giving
them on average 10 years in excellent health (30 QALYS) against an intervention that
enabled 40 people to have move from frequent dialysis to less frequent dialysis over
five years (0.1 QALYs per person per year times 5 years times 40 people = 20
QALYs). Without QALYs, it would be impossible to make a fair comparison between
the two interventions. QALYs enable insurers to decide how to allocate scarce
resources.
17. Diana Ognyanova, Annette Zentner & Reinhard Busse, Pharmaceutical Reform
2010 in Germany: Striking a Balance Between Innovation and Affordability, 17
EUROHEALTH, no. 1, 2008, at 11, 11-13.
http://apps.who.int/medicinedocs/documents/s20965en/s20965en.pdf Sotiris Vandoros
& Tom Stargardt, Reforms in the Greek Pharmaceutical Market During the Financial
Crisis, 109 HEALTH POL'Y 1, 1-2 (2013) http://www.hche.uni-
hamburg.de/de/Bilder/newsletter/Vandoros-Stargardt-2013--Reforms-in-the-Greek-
pharmaceutical-market.pdf.
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system constrained by budgets-which is common in public insurance
systems-there is a risk that the insurer will decide to reduce the level
of payments. This may occur for very different reasons. If the state
suffers a financial crisis, it may be forced to reduce the relevant budget.
Alternatively, the budget may become constrained by an influx of new,
valuable drugs, which create budgetary pressure for price reductions of
other drugs. In any case, in a world of fixed (and sometimes
unpredictably varying) budgets, there is no certainty that a given drug
will be funded at the expected level.
Reward systems face a similar problem. Typically, they are
designed with a fixed or quasi-fixed budget. They are subject to the
risk of the reward stream being reduced unexpectedly because of
government budgetary shortfalls, and to the risk that new drugs will use
up some of the rewards anticipated by others. An international reward
system, in which multiple governments participate, may create
additional risks in the sense that there are more chances for a given
government to reduce funding; but it can also mitigate risks through
diversification of funding sources and less dependence on a single
government's budget.
A low reward per QALY may also occur if products registered
with the reward scheme have higher than expected health benefits. If
there is a fixed reward payout and the system allocates the reward
proportionally between products according to the number of QALYs
generated by each, then, by construction, the reward per QALY must
be smaller. This, however, does not necessarily increase risk to the
participating firms, since the total amount paid out is constant. This has
attractive properties as a form of insurance to the industry. For
example, if research productivity decreases, there will be fewer
products competing for the fixed rewards, and hence the reward per
product will increase. On average, the revenues of firms will be
protected because the rewards remain unchanged. In a price-based
system, lower productivity results in fewer products developed, lower
profits for the firms, and, ultimately, lower investment.
Considering all these risks, it is not apparent that reward
systems are more likely to face uncertainty in the average revenues per
QALY than the price system.
2014 355
WHITTIER LAW REVIEW
B. RISKS RELATING TO THE MEASUREMENT OF HEALTHBENEFITS
Both the reward and price systems make revenues contingent on
health benefits, but apply different systems of measurement. The price
system uses pre-approval clinical trials as the basis for estimating
health benefits per unit of the drug; the reward system does the same,
while allowing for adjustments based on evidence of how the drug is
used and what the benefits are in practice.
We need to start with understanding risk. The first way of
assessing the risk of a reimbursement system is to think of the risk as
variance of reimbursement from the perfectly informed market
outcome. We could think of the "perfectly informed market outcome"
as the stream of revenues that would have been captured by the firm if
patients, doctors, and payers had perfect knowledge about the clinical
effects and other effects of the product and all its alternatives, and there
were no other distortions in the market. While no pharmaceutical
market looks like this, the "ideal" market can be a useful benchmark.
Firms are assumed to have a preference for predictability, but
they are not better able to assess what the perfect "market" would do
compared to what the regulator would do. Firms also have a preference
for higher expected revenues. Managers in companies are risk averse,
and their preferences should influence the decisions of the firm,
resulting in the firm seeking to avoid risk.18
By construction, a system in which there is on-going
measurement about the clinical effects of the product must get closer to
the "perfectly informed market outcome" than a system that relies only
on measuring outcomes in the context of clinical trials before
registration. Thus, by our first measure of risk, the reward system
appears to be superior to the price system.
An alternative measure of risk is whether the firm obtains a
predictable stream of revenues from the product. The problem here is
tying down the notion of predictability. Let us assume that the
prediction of revenues is made at the time the product enters into Phase
3 trials. 19 In this case, our measure of risk is the variance from the
prediction made at that stage. Would either kind of revenue stream
18. Risk aversion is a technical term indicating that preferences are such that an
individual would prefer a certain payment of a given value.
19. Clinical trials involving humans are classified into three types. Phase 3 trials are
the last stage and generally involve a large number of subjects.
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have less variance from the prediction? Of course, the main risk in this
case is the performance of the product in the clinical trials. Compared
with this risk, risks concerning exactly how the product is reimbursed
are secondary. However, let us assume that the pharmaceutical firm has
an unbiased view of the likely success of the product if approved.
Let us then consider which type of reimbursement of the
product creates more risk, in the sense of being closer to the unbiased
expectation of the firm. By construction, the price system is designed
so that price is based on the performance of the product in the clinical
trials. To the extent that the actual performance of the product varies
from that in the clinical trials,20 basing reimbursement only on the
clinical trial results creates more risk. Essentially, the sample in the
clinical trial is smaller than the sample in the population, and the
distribution of characteristics among the clinical trials' subjects will
differ from the distribution of characteristics among the population of
patients who will use the drug. This automatically means that the risk
of errors in the estimate of the product's actual value must be greater in
the price system.
How does this impact the firm? Assuming that reimbursement
entities are seeking to limit utilization when prices exceed value, a
product that is priced too high will be under-utilized and likely under-
perform financially, unless and until the firm lowers prices to more
realistically reflect value to patients. A product that is priced too low
will under-perform financially, relative to its true value, unless and
until a firm can raise prices. In an environment where reimbursements
are ridge, either up or down, errors in the estimates of a product's
actual value will lead to systematic financial underperformance.
Firms are not the only participants in the system that are exposed
to risk. The insurer-in many cases a government agency-and
patients also face risk in any system. Insurers also have an interest in
budget stability, which prize systems allow for, since the annual payout
is less subject to fluctuations than in a price system, particularly when
the reward fund is fixed in size and completely predictable. Insurers in
the price system are potentially harmed because deviation of the actual
effectiveness from the measured effectiveness may result in the risk of
paying too much or too little for a given treatment.
20. Sean R. Tunis, Daniel B. Stryer & Carolyn M. Clancy, Practical Clinical
Trials: Increasing the Value of Clinical Research for Decision Making in Clinical and
Health Policy, 290 JAMA 1624, 1625 (2003).
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As noted above, the consequences of paying too much for a given
treatment may include avoiding utilization of a health improving
intervention, which undermines the objectives of the insurers (and
consumers) of the product. The consequence of paying too little for a
given treatment is to inadequate incentives for R&D, which also
undermines the objectives of the insurers (and consumers) seeking to
support innovation. At least in regards to these considerations alone,
both sides-firms and insurers-have lower risk in a prize system that
matches rewards to outcomes than in a price system that is based upon
information from pre-approval clinical trials. The total annual payout
by the insurer fluctuates unpredictably in the price system, and this
creates risks for both payers and firms.
In a prize system, there is greater stability of the total annual
payout, but there will be unpredictability with regard to the investment
return for a particular innovative product, due to two factors, namely
the emerging evidence regarding the value of the product in use and its
utilization, and the degree of competition from others providing
innovations that are rivals for prize fund money. Neither of these
factors is unique to the prize system, since both exist also for the price
system. There are some differences, however. In the price system, rival
drug developers have incentives to develop me-too products that use
similar mechanisms to achieve similar results, without technically
infringing on patent protection. This often constitutes a significant risk
in the price system, as the new me-too products may significantly erode
the innovator's market share. Under the prize system described above,
there are fewer incentives to develop products that simply match
existing outcomes, and so the risk for that particular type of
competition has been reduced. 21
What does this mean for measurement? Measurement in a prize
system needs to be, at least, no worse than in the price system.
III. MORAL HAZARD
A second problem that can arise from imperfect measurement of
22health outcomes in prize systems is moral hazard. A common
21. James Love & Tim Hubbard, The Big Idea: Prizes to Stimulate R&D for New
Medicines, 82 Cuc.-KENT L. REv. 1519, 1524 (2007).
22. Moral hazard is a result of situations where an individual or company does not
bear the consequences of its actions. For example, the individual or company might
have a tendency to take more risk because the costs will not be fully felt by the risk-
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argument against the pay-for-performance mechanism is the potential
for firms "gaming" the system. If measurement is imperfect,
pharmaceutical companies could manipulate the process either through
exaggerating the per unit value of their products or through
exaggerating the number of patients who benefit from the product.
Moral hazard is common in medicine. For example, Marshall et
al. examined the performance of health care in the United States and
found that surgeons were hesitant to perform on high-risk patients
because even one death could have a high impact on a surgeon's
performance rates.23 In this case, because mortality data was used as an
indicator for qualit of clinical care, there was room for a reactive
gaming response.2 "Complete specification of targets and how
performance will be measured almost invites reactive gaming."25 In a
system where rewards are based on health outcomes, pharmaceutical
companies might be incentivized to game the system. For example if
drug rewards are based on the number of deaths averted, companies
could try to game the system by incentivizing providers to only
administer drugs to "low-risk" patients so that death would not be
linked to the drug, and in turn show better health outcomes even
though a high-risk patient may have benefited more from the treatment.
An example of this could be administering chemotherapy only to
patients known to have a very high survival rate instead of those that
have a lower survival rate but could still benefit from the treatment.
Unfortunately, no performance indicator can be assumed to remove
gaming completely. Performance measurement tools used in the prize
system should have a level of transparency and ambiguity as to not
invite gaming, according to Bevan and Hood.26 They argue that a level
of ambiguity in measuring targets will reduce gaming.27 Using the
taking party. In particular, moral hazard is a problem when one side has greater
information than the other (i.e., information asymmetry). In the case of
pharmaceuticals this may lead to demand for the product exceeding what is expected
under normal market conditions. This results in a welfare loss to society because the
cost of the drug exceeds the benefit to the patients.
23. See MARTIN MARSHALL ET AL., DYING To KNow: PUBLIc RELEASE OF
INFORMATION ABOUT QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE 87, 96 (2000).
24. See id. at 95-96.
25. Gwyn Bevan & Christopher Hood, What's Measured is What Matters: Targets
and Gaming in the English Public Health Care System, 84 PUB. ADMIN. 517, 533
(2006).
26. Id. at 533-34.
27. Id. at 533.
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above example, if the measurement were based on something a bit
more ambiguous such as health outcome instead of mortality, the
surgeons might have been less likely to avert procedures on high-risk
patients.
Here, it is important to acknowledge that opportunity for gaming
is present in the price system. The question is whether the opportunity
for moral hazard is any greater in the prize system than in the price
system.
In the price system, payers (regulators, insurers, governments)
will be motivated to devalue the innovation while innovators will
overstate the value of the drug. The payer will be tempted to grant a
much lower valuation of the innovation in order to reduce the price that
must be paid. Decreasing the price too much will diminish incentives
for innovators. On the other hand, innovators will want to exaggerate
the value of the product in order to obtain a higher price. They will be
tempted to hide information about the product, or to pitch the
advantages of the product in the most appealing light.
Recent attempts by pharmaceutical companies to hide, deny, or
minimize negative outcomes associated with drugs suggest misaligned
interests of pharmaceutical companies with those of increasing health
outcomes.28 The quality of published literature is constantly being
scrutinized due to biases and motivations outside of the public good.
As noted in the Tragedy of the Commons, individual profit
maximization may endanger public good.29 For example, in 2000,
Pfizer published information regarding the safety and efficacy of the
drug Celebrex in The Journal of the American Medical Association,
which showed that, when used for six months, the drug reduced the
incidence of gastrointestinal complications. 30 However, Pfizer failed to
release the second half of the study, which showed that, in the
following six months, nearly all incidence of gastrointestinal
complications was associated with patients on Celebrex, thereby
28. See Mayer Brezis, Big Pharma and Health Care: Unsolvable Conflict of
Interest Between Private Enterprise and Public Health, 45 ISR. J. PSYCHIATRY
RELATED Sci. 83, 84 (2008).
29. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244
(1968).
30. John Abramson & Barbara Starfield, The Effect of Conflict of Interest on
Biomedical Research and Clinical Practice Guidelines: Can We Trust the Evidence in
Evidence-Based Medicine?, 18 J. AM. BoARD FAM. PRAC. 414, 415 (2005).
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negating the findings shown in the first study.31 As such events
demonstrate, the current price system creates strong incentives for
companies to alter or hide evidence to increase monetary gain and
market share at the cost of patient outcomes and safety.32
Another form of potential moral hazard in the price system is
"disease mongering," when external sources convince people that they
are sick in order to expand the market share of a product. Trivial
conditions such as normal ageing could be incorrectly categorized as
osteoporosis, leading individuals to think that they need some
treatment. In doing so, companies claim rewards by "benefiting"
patients who never needed the treatment in the first place. For example,
someone with abdominal discomfort could be diagnosed with irritable
bowel syndrome. The person would then proceed to take the treatment
and be "cured" when in reality the treatment was never needed.
The vulnerability of the prize system to these types of moral
hazards relates to the quality of measurement. With accurate
measurement, the prize authority would know how many people were
treated, what the typical response to treatment was, and the likely
counterfactual outcomes for those patients. It is necessary to know not
just the outcome, but also the counterfactual outcome, i.e. what the
outcome would have been in the absence of the treatment, to assess the
value of the treatment given. Of course, this is ambitious. But the prize
system, in its exposure to moral hazard, resembles the price system.
The area of most concern for prize systems is that poor people are
protected from some exploitation by their poverty. Innovative
pharmaceutical companies have few incentives to get very poor people
to take a drug to cure a disease they do not have, because they acquire
small or zero profits from selling to such people. With a prize based on
health impact, companies might find it attractive to try to sell large
volumes of drugs to poor people who can afford the generic price, but
who do not really need any medicine. In the absence of good
measurement, such a strategy would be profitable, but bad for people
taking those drugs. In principle, people in developed countries are
already vulnerable to such over-medicalization, as they are convinced
to take unneeded drugs, which generate profits for the industry.
However, people in developed countries are relatively well protected
3 1. Id.
32. See Brezis, supra note 28, at 84.
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from abuse through laws, regulations, and comprehensive health care
systems: the poor and uneducated in developing countries would
present an easier mark. Thus, a key requirement for prize systems is to
ensure that the measurement is good enough in developing countries to
ensure that poor people do not become the prey of unscrupulous
practices to sell unneeded drugs. Good quality measurement of health
benefits would solve the problem since firms would be motivated to
sell products only to patients who could actually benefit from them.
From the above discussion it is clear that the potential for moral
hazard will be present regardless of whether we are to examine the
prize system or the price system. However, the prize system would
need to pay special attention to measurements where there is a potential
for excessive sales to poor people becoming an income source without
corresponding benefits to the patients.
IV. CONCLUSION
Delinked reward systems have been challenged as presenting
insuperable difficulties in implementation because they rely on
measuring and rewarding pharmaceutical companies for actual health
outcomes. As this paper has shown, however, other systems of paying
for pharmaceuticals, including the familiar system in which insurers
assess the effects of drugs before they agree to insure them, also
require measurement, and make the revenues of pharmaceutical
companies, as well as the expenses of insurers, explicitly dependent on
these measurements. Delinked reward systems can reduce risk for both
innovative pharmaceutical companies and insurers, and achieve better
outcomes for patients at the same time.
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